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ARTICLES
THE ROLE OF COURTS IN THE DEBATE ON
ASSISTED SUICIDE: A COMMUNITARIAN
APPROACH
DONALD L. BESCHLE*
INTRODUCTION
A generation ago, the "right to die," the notion that the
Constitution protected at least some forms of euthanasia, com-
manded far less than general acceptance.' To a generation with
fresh memories of the horrible consequences of declaring some
forms of life "unworthy" to continue, even passive forms of eutha-
nasia were suspect.2 Even the common law right to refuse medi-
cal treatment required justification. In reported cases involving
patients' refusal of lifesaving procedures, courts commonly
framed the issue as one of free exercise of religion.' Mere asser-
tions of autonomy unsupported by some additional claim of con-
stitutional protection could be expected to fail.4
* Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School; B.A. Fordham
University; J.D. New York University School of Law; L.L.M. Temple University
School of Law.
1. See Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy
Killing"Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969 (1958). See also Tate v. Canonica, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 28 (1960); People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690 (Mich. 1920); State v. Ehlers,
119 A. 15 (N.J. 1922).
2. In 1950, the World Medical Association, at the same meeting where
the German medical profession was readmitted, approved a resolution which
"condemn [ed] the practice of euthanasia under any circumstances." See OLIVE
R. RUSSELL, FREEDOM To DIE: MORAL AND LEGAL AsPECTS OF EUTHANASIA 94
(1977). Dr. Leo Alexander, American medical consultant at the Nuremberg
trials, in a widely noted article, wrote that Nazi crimes "started with the
acceptance of an attitude, basic to the euthanasia movement, that there is such
a thing as life not worthy to be lived ...." Id. at 93.
3. See, e.g., Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Il. 1972);
Montgomery v. Board of Retirement of Kern Co., 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Ct. App.
1973); In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1965).
4. See, e.g., In re President of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1010
(D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
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In the fourteen years between In re Quinlan,5 the New Jersey
case which brought the "right to die" to national prominence,
and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,6 the United
States Supreme Court's first encounter with the issue, enormous
changes took place. In the mid-1970s, Roe v. Wade7 had only
recently made clear that the right of privacy established in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut' was about more than merely keeping govern-
ment out of people's bedrooms. In medicine, the increased
ability to prolong life and the expense of doing so had not yet
become prominent national issues. And so the Supreme Court
of New Jersey assumed the role of pioneer by upholding a claim
that the father of a woman in an irreversible coma had the right
to authorize discontinuance of "all extraordinary medical proce-
dures" in furtherance of his daughter's right to forego
treatment.9
When Cruzan came before the United States Supreme
Court, the legal landscape was quite different. Reaction to Quin-
lan was generally positive,"0 and courts and legislatures swiftly
endorsed its core conclusions. State courts held that competent
patients had a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment which
needed no bolstering from traditional constitutional rights, such
as free exercise, to prevail against countervailing state interests."
In addition, courts held that patients no longer able to articulate
their wishes have a right to exercise this choice through proxy
decisionmakers."2 Legislatures moved to codify these rights, and
5. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
6. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing abortion as part of the privacy right
implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment).
8. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating state restrictions on the use of
contraceptives by married persons).
9. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 651. Petitioner Joseph Quinlan initially
framed his claim in terms of freedom of religion and freedom from cruel and
unusual punishment, both of which were rejected by the court in favor of
extending the privacy right to euthanasia. Id. at 661-64.
10. See, e.g., Symposium Panel, Is There a Right to Die, 12 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBS. 489 (1976); David P. Falk, Note, In re Quinlan: One Court's Answer to
the Problem of Death With Dignity, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 285 (1977); Margaret
W. Randall, Note, The Right to Die a Natural Death: A Discussion of In re Quinlan
and the California Natural Death Act, 46 U. CINN. L. REV. 192 (1977).
11. See Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV.
L. REv. 1519, 1643-76 (1990).
12. Id. The cases on advance directives are summarized in Gregory G.
Sarno, Annotation, Living Wills: Construction, Validity and Effect, 49 A.L.R.4th 812
(1986).
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"living will" statutes proliferated.'" Commentary was overwhelm-
ingly favorable; one was as likely to find criticism of courts and
legislatures for moving too cautiously as one was to find criticism
of the fundamental direction in which the law was moving.14
Thus, Cruzan was more significant for its implicit endorse-
ment of the post-Quinlan trend than for its narrow holding which
permits a state to require "clear and convincing" evidence of an
incompetent patient's desires before permitting a surrogate deci-
sion to discontinue treatment. Eight of nine justices appear to
have recognized a due process right of a competent patient to
refuse treatment, 5 and five appear to have recognized a right to
have clearly expressed advance directives respected." Clearly
the cutting edge of the "right to die" debate has shifted signifi-
candy. The modern debate over the legal status of euthanasia is
usually traced to Glanville Williams' book, The Sanctity of Life and
the Criminal Law, which strongly supported legalization of eutha-
nasia when requested by an adult suffering from an incurable
illness that caused severe pain or made the patient incapable of
leading a rational existence. 7 The most prominent response to
Williams came from Yale Kamisar, who questioned the validity of
Williams' conclusion that such a request was voluntary and
informed and who also saw even a narrow exception to a general
prohibition on some forms of euthanasia as the first step down a
13. See Marni J. Lerner, Note, State Natural Death Acts: Illusory Protection of
Individuals' Life-Sustaining Treatment Decisions, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 184
n.46 (1992).
14. Thus, Ms. Lerner concludes that legislation has not been sufficiently
protective of patient autonomy. Id. See also Eugenie Anne Gifford, Artes
Moriendi: Active Euthanasia and the Art of Dying, 40 UCLA L. Rv. 1545 (1993).
15. The opinion of the Court cautiously states: "The principle that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). The
dissenters more forcefully affirm "a fundamental right to be free of unwanted
[treatment]." Id. at 302 (Brennan,J., dissenting); see also id. at 343 (Stevens,J.,
dissenting). OnlyJustice Scalia refuses to recognize that the due process clause
plays a part in these cases. Id. at 292-301 (Scalia, J., concurring).
16. The dissenters, who would have refused to allow Missouri to impose a
standard of clear and convincing evidence, obviously extend the right to
advance directives. Justice O'Connor, while permitting a high evidentiary
standard, strongly suggests that the Constitution compels respect for a clear and
explicit advance directive. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287-92 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
17. GLANVILLE WILLIAMs, THE SANCrrIY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1957). The book expands on the 1956 lecture series at Columbia University
which largely touched off the contemporary debate on euthanasia.
19951
370 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9
"slippery slope.""I Post-Cruzan developments certainly suggest
that the "slippery slope" metaphor has some validity. Types of
claims once controversial are now routinely accepted; types of
claims once clearly beyond the pale are now merely controver-
sial.' 9 But, of course, one commentator's dangerous descent is
another's logical and positive development.
The two most common distinctions used by lawyers and
ethicists to categorize euthanasia have been the distinctions
between "voluntary" and "involuntary" euthanasia and between
"active" and "passive" forms. Voluntary euthanasia is chosen by
the patient; involuntary euthanasia is chosen by another regard-
less of.the patient's wishes. Active methods of euthanasia inter-
vene to hasten death; passive methods merely refuse to intervene
to prolong life.2" Traditionally, commentators have found volun-
tary and passive euthanasia far more acceptable than involuntary
and active euthanasia. But the usefulness of the categories them-
selves has been called into question.21
The debate over living wills and proxy decisionmaking has
turned mostly on questions of the scope of what is "voluntary."
Definitions have differed, but for the most part commentators
recognize the need to proscribe clearly involuntary euthanasia.
2
In contrast, the active-passive distinction has come under more
fundamental attack. A new generation of "right to die" claims
has arisen which seek more than merely the right to refuse treat-
ment. Instead, they claim constitutional protection for assistance
in actively ending one's life, and immunity from prosecution not
only of the patient seeking death, but of the patient's agent.
Fundamentally, these claims are assaults on the active-passive dis-
18. Kamisar, supra note 1. See also Yale Kamisar, When Is There a
Constitutional "Right To Die"? When Is There No Constitutional Right To Live?, 25 GA.
L. REv. 1203 (1991).
19. Professor Kamisar notes that Williams devoted much of his argument
to defending "passive" euthanasia. Cruzan makes clear that at least in certain
circumstances, the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment is a right. In his
argument in favor of "active" euthanasia, Williams limited himself to cases
involving dying patients who asked for death to relieve suffering. Today many
advocates of euthanasia do not consider those circumstances to be essential.
Kamisar, supra note 18, at 1205-14.
20. See GERMAIN GRISEZ &JOSEPH M. BOYLE, LIFE AND DEATH WrrH LIBERTY
AND JUSTICE: A CONTIBUTION TO THE EUTHANASIA DEBATE 86-97, 139-42
(1979).
21. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 1, at 1014-30 (on the voluntary-
involuntary distinction); Gregory Gelfand, Euthanasia and the Terminally Ill
Patient, 63 NEB. L. Ruv. 741, 753-56 (1984) (on the active-passive distinction).
22. Even Glanville Williams advocated euthanasia "where it is performed
upon a dying patient with his consent," not when it is involuntary. WILLIAMS,
supra note 17, at 311.
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tinction although they also require serious reexamination of the
voluntary-involuntary dichotomy.
As a matter of law and social policy, if not of ethics, the exist-
ence of a right to at least some forms of voluntary, passive eutha-
nasia seems settled. Is assisted suicide merely a logical extension
of this right, or are we on Kamisar's slippery slope? Is the active-
passive distinction indefensible, essential, or somewhere in
between? If society does not punish one who attempts suicide, is
there any reason to punish that person's agent? And how are
these decisions to be made: by courts, legislatures, individuals, or
some combination?
It has been observed that, while initially we create language,
evntually it creates us. In other words, our experience is filtered
through preexisting mental concepts, and how we interpret
experience, then, depends on the tools we have for expression.
The same is true of our legal and ethical categories. Usually, our
first instinct is to try to fit experience into preexisting concepts.
Both our preferred approach to legal and ethical issues, and the
range of alternatives which we regard as available, will pro-
foundly affect the conclusions we reach.
Constitutional rights claims tend to be analyzed not only in
popular discourse, but also among lawyers and judges, using one
of two approaches: a libertarian approach or a majoritarian
approach. While a deontological approach is used by some
ethicists and many ordinary people in reaching moral conclu-
sions, such an approach plays at best only a subsidiary role in
constitutional analysis; it is not a viable alternative for those dis-
satisfied with either of the dominant models. There is, however,
a more promising, if less well-defined, alternative: a communitar-
ian approach. Before examining that alternative, it will be useful
to examine the two most common approaches.
I. THE LIBERTARIAN APPROACH
Perhaps the most respected approach to rights claims is one
which sees individual rights as absolute trumps over community
welfare or preferences.2 3 Debate may rage over what the rights
are or how to determine them, but nearly all participants in
American political or legal discourse seem to take strong liberta-
rian positions on some rights issues.24 Since the inception of the
23. In contemporary jurisprudential thought, the "rights as trumps"
metaphor is most closely associated with Ronald Dworkin. RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY Xi (1977).
24. "The debate does not include the issue of whether citizens have some
moral rights against their Government. It seems accepted on all sides that they
1995]
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modern debate over the "right to die," the libertarian approach
has been by far the dominant mode of analysis. 25 This is unsur-
prising. Most Americans accept the proposition that there is
some core of absolute individual liberty, and the logical starting
point in deciding what the scope of that liberty is would seem to
be the proposition that one has dominion over one's own body.26
Once a libertarian approach is adopted, therefore, it is difficult
to avoid the conclusion that one may act toward one's own body
in a way which society sees as destructive. 27 Libertarian defer-
ence to individual choice has at least one core limitation. The
choice which commands respect must actually be a choice. At
some point coercion, deception or incapacity make an articu-
lated "choice" into the product of circumstances outside the indi-
vidual - often the will of others. While this may not invalidate
the individual's "choice," it certainly challenges the easy justifica-
tion of why that choice should be respected through the lan-
guage of libertarian individualism.28
do.... Some philosophers, of course, reject the idea that citizens have rights
apart from what the law happens to give them.... But that view has never been
part of our orthodox political theory.... It is much in dispute, of course, what
particular rights citizens have." Id. at 184. Thus, Justice Scalia, a paragon of
deference to the legislature in privacy cases, is the Court's strongest champion
of individual property rights. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Pennell v. City of SanJose, 485 U.S. 1, 15 (1988) (Scalia,
J., dissenting in part); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987).
25. See supra notes 5-17.
26. Thus, the analytical starting point in Cruzan: "Before the turn of the
century, this Court observed that '[nlo right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference
of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of the law.' " 497 U.S. at
269 (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891)).
27. The argument, of course, seems to have already progressed from the
right to control one's own body to the right to refuse medical treatment
endorsed in Cruzan to a general endorsement of negative euthanasia. See
Joseph Fletcher, Ethics and Euthanasia, in To LIVE AND TO DIE: WHEN, WHY AND
How 113 (Robert H. Williams ed., 1974) ("Arguing pro and con about negative
euthanasia is therefore merely flogging a dead horse.") The next step would
assert that the "active-passive" distinction makes no sense. SeeJames Rachels,
Euthanasia, Killing and Letting Die, in ETHICAL ISSUES RELATING TO LIFE AND
DEATH 146 (John Ladd ed., 1979).
Of course, it is possible to avoid that progression. Hobbes was the first to
found a system of political philosophy on an individual's right to life, and saw
that right as inalienable, thus denying even the individual the right to dispose
of his or her life. See EIKE-HENNER W. KLUGE, THE ETHICS OF DELIBERATE DEATH
103-05 (1981).
28. Thus, early efforts to regulate wages and hours were struck down as
violations of the "liberty" of contract. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
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Even strong libertarians must concede, that individual
choices are not made in a social vacuum; they are at least to some
extent influenced by society. This is not enough to refute liberta-
rianism, but it is enough to put us on guard. At some point,
influence will become enough to at least warrant serious reflec-
tion before assigning "trump" status to individual decisions out
of respect for individual liberty. Where this point is has long
been a key question in the "right to die" debate. As noted above,
most still defend the distinction between voluntary and involun-
tary euthanasia. 9
Thus, one might argue that the refusal of lifesaving medical
treatment should not be respected because the patient's pain
makes the decision to die involuntary."0 More obviously, one
might argue that the decision of a proxy decisionmaker need not
be respected, or at the very least must be justified on grounds
other than libertarian individualism, since it is not the decision
of the individual at all.31 The response to these objections has
been to advocate the use of advance directives, executed well
before an individual's need for a surrogate decision maker.3 2 As
argued elsewhere, this creates its own problems; it is by no means
clear that an individual's statement of what should be done at
some indefinite point in the future will correspond to the same
individual's choice when confronted with the previously
unknown experience of imminent death.3 3 This is not to say that
(1905). When a poor laborer accepts work at an extremely low wage and with
long hours, is that an exercise of autonomy, or a coerced act? The point is at
least debatable.
29. In the introduction to his book advocating euthanasia, Derek
Humphry repeats his commitment to voluntary euthanasia, and dismisses the
notion that acceptance of this would lead to involuntary euthanasia, "something
not even the most rabid enthusiast has advocated." DEREK HuMPHRY, LET ME
DIE BEFORE I WAKE 4 (1981).
30. See Kamisar, supra note 1, at 985-93.
31. Dr. Arnold Relman, for example, stresses that while the informed
consent of the patient or family is important, inevitably much of the decision-
making process must be delegated to the physician's expertise. Arnold S.
Relman, The Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL
ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 138-47 (A.
Edward Doudera & J. Douglas Peters eds., 1982). See also Michael Walzer,
Consenting to One's Own Death: The Case of Brutus, in BENIFICENT EUTHANASIA 100-
05 (Marvin Kohl ed., 1975), in which Walzer discusses the legitimacy of
automatic deference to a principal's wishes. "Should we simply listen to a man,
as if we were his servants, when he asks to die, or should we make an
independent judgment, as friends (I think) must do?" Id. at 104.
32. See JAMES M. HOEFLER, DEATHRIGHT: CULTURE, MEDICINE, POLITICS
AND THE RIGHT TO DIE 187-230 (1994).
33. Donald L. Beschle, Autonomous Decisionmaking and Social Choice:
Examining the "Right to Die," 77 KY. LJ. 319 (1989).
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the decisions of surrogate decisionmakers should not be
respected, but it does call into question the justification of that
conclusion on purely libertarian grounds.
When we turn to the question of assisted suicide, a new set
of questions arises. How does the involvement of an agent
change things? If we assume that the voluntary-involuntary dis-
tinction must be preserved, what steps must we take to assure
that influence flows from the patient to the agent, and not the
other way? Does the agent have a duty merely to obey instruc-
tions, or is there a duty to determine that the instructions them-
selves are sufficiently free of undue outside influence? Recent
cases illustrate the libertarian approach to these questions and
also highlight the flaws of such thought.
There may be no better example of singleminded commit-
ment to libertarianism in "right to die" jurisprudence than the
California Court of Appeals decision in Bouvia v. Superior Court.34
Elizabeth Bouvia was at the time a 28-year-old woman, a.
quadriplegic suffering from severe cerebral palsy. 5 The court
found that she was "intelligent, very mentally competent," but
"physically helpless" and "totally dependent upon others."3 6 She
brought an action to compel hospital authorities to disconnect a
nasogastric feeding tube so that she might starve to death.37 This
case, like Quinlan and other early "right to die" cases, then,
sought withdrawal of medical treatment rather than active inter-
vention to hasten death. But the "active-passive" distinction has
been under so much fire that there is little reason to believe that
the distinction was crucial.3 . Of much more significance
34. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986).
35. Id. at 299-300.
36. Id. at 300.
37. Id.
38. Justice Compton, in her concurring opinion, clearly rejects any
distinction between active and passive methods. Id. at 307 (Compton, J.,
concurring). The active-passive distinction depends on how one defines an act.
Is the failure to do something an act? In some legal contexts, where a duty to
act exists, it is. For example, a parent who fails to call a doctor for a sick child
may be guilty of homicide, while a stranger who does the same has done
nothing criminal. See WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAw 184
(1972). In light of this, one can understand the argument that the distinction
is artificial: "[T]he rightness or wrongness of euthanasia.., whether direct or
indirect, depends on the situation. Neither form is intrinsically or invariably
good or evil. Sometimes mercy killing is right; sometimes 'letting patients go' is
wrong. It depends." Joseph Fletcher, The "Right" to Live and the "Right" to Die, in
BENIFICENT EUTHANASIA supra note 31, at 50. For a defense of the active-passive
distinction, see David Louisell, Euthanasia and Biathanasia: On Dying and Killing,
22 CATH. U. L. REv. 723 (1973).
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was the undisputed fact that Ms. Bouvia's condition was not
terminal.39
This fact did not trouble the court. Finding that "a desire to
terminate one's life is probably the ultimate exercise of one's
right to privacy, "4 the court then held that "the right to refuse
treatment does not need the sanction or approval by any legisla-
tive act, directing how and when it shall be exercised."41 Specifi-
cally, the state cannot limit the right to terminal patients, nor, it
seems, even to conditions of a specified level of seriousness. Val-
uation of the quantity and quality of one's life is not a medical
decision for her physicians to make. Neither is it a legal question
whose soundness is to be resolved by lawyers orjudges. It is not a
conditional right subject to approval by ethics committees or
courts of law. It is a moral and philosophical decision that, being
a competent adult, is her's alone.42
And, in case this statement is not sufficiently clear, the court
goes on to criticize the trial court for questioning Ms. Bouvia's
motives: "If a right exists, it matters not what 'motivates' its exer-
cise. We find nothing in the law to suggest the right to refuse
medical treatment may be exercised only if the patient's motives
meet someone else's approval."4" In a concurring opinion, Jus-
tice Compton makes clear that she regards effectuation of a
desire to end a subjectively intolerable condition as "an absolute
right," and that this includes the right to enlist active assistance
from medical practitioners.'
Bouvia is strong stuff. Even cases which generally follow its
lead often feel the need to soften its libertarian edges. Thus, in
McKay v. Bergstedt,45 the Nevada Supreme Court held, with exten-
sive quotations from Bouvia, that a quadriplegic had the right to
direct the removal of a respirator, whether or not the
quadriplegic was terminally ill.' Unlike the Bouvia court, how-
ever, the Nevada court clearly stated that such a right was limited
to physical illness and did not include those whose lives were
"unbearably miserable because of [their] mental state."47 The
court also limited its holding to those with irreversible condi-
39. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301-02.
40. Id. at 306.
41. Id. at 302.
42. Id. at 305.
43. Id. at 306.
44. Id. at 307-08 (Compton, J., concurring).
45. 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
46. Id. at 630-31.
47. Id. at 625.
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tions4 and gave the state more leeway to take steps to at least try
to convince a patient to choose care alternatives over death.49
The Bergstedt court, unlike the Bouvia court, at least recog-
nized the possibility of over-extension of the premises underlying
the strong libertarian approach to the "right to die." The liberta-
rian model, when dealing with a competent adult, assumes that
statements of desire are the product of rational calculation, and
that they reflect what the individual actually'wants, rather than
being disguised cries for something else. The spurned lover who
says "I want to die" is likely to mean that he really wants his
beloved back. This is true even if we accept that as between
death and life without her, he genuinely does want to die.
But to recognize the possibility of irrational calculation and
ambiguous expression is to suggest a degree of interdependence
which is contrary to libertarian thought. To take Ms. Bouvia's "I
want to die" at face value is to absolve the rest of us from having
to consider whether we are responsible for having brought about
the circumstances leading to the request and, prospectively,
whether we are duty-bound to change things so that she no
longer finds death the only acceptable alternative. The court's
picture of an autonomous, rational decision by Elizabeth Bouvia
is deeply problematic. The court briefly mentions that prior to
deciding that she wanted to die, she suffered a miscarriage, her
husband left her, her parents told her that they no longer could
care for her, and she unsuccessfully sought a permanent place to
live and receive constant care.5 ° It hardly takes great insight to
suspect that in light of these facts, her wish to die was not an
autonomous response to her medical condition, but rather a
reaction to a series of perceived rejections or other incidents
which made her feel isolated and unwanted. 51
48. Id. at 630.
49. Id. The court does make one significant distinction between terminal
and non-terminal cases. Where the patient is terminal, i.e., with a life
expectancy of less than six months, the patient's decision to refuse or withdraw
treatment must prevail. In addition, any health care provider who provides
"any sedative or pain medication to ease the patient's pre-death anxieties or
pain," is immune from criminal or civil liability. The possible blurring of the
active-passive distinction is evident. Where the patient is not terminal, the court
may balance the patient's right against the state's interest in preserving life.
Again, the court hesitates to apply the full force of the Bouvia rationale. Id. at
630-31.
50. 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
51. See, e.g., Stanley S. Herr, et al., No Place To Go: Refusal of Life-Sustaining
Treatment by Competent Persons with Physical Disabilities, 8 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 3
(1992).
COMMUNITARIANISM AND ASSISTED SUICIDE
A number of activists for the rights of the disabled were
appalled by the Bouvia decision, not only because of its outcome,
but also because of some of the court's specific reasoning.52
Although it denied that anyone needs the approval of a court to
choose death, 3 the court nonetheless went on to, in effect,
express its approval of Ms. Bouvia's decision:
Although alert, bright, sensitive, perhaps even brave and
feisty, she must lie immobile . . . and must lie physically
helpless subject to ignominy, embarrassment, humiliation
and dehumanizing aspects created by her helplessness....
We cannot conceive it to be the policy of this State to
inflict such an ordeal upon anyone.5 4
This characterization of the life of a quadriplegic promotes a
social attitude likely to at least indirectly influence the choices of
disabled persons in the future. But libertarian theory ignores the
connection; those choices will, of course, be seen as "brave and
feisty" expressions of autonomy.
55
The Bouvia court is, at least, consistent. Once it determines
that the actor is a competent adult, it concludes that any intru-
sion into the decision to die would be unacceptable paternalism.
The Bergstedt court refused to go that far. The decision to
exclude purely emotional suffering and reversible physical condi-
tions from the universe of acceptable justifications for exercise of
the "right to die" surely seems correct, but it is inconsistent with
the libertarian tone of the rest of the opinion. If the state may
"paternalistically" stop the suicide of one in mental anguish, why
may it not do so when the patient's physical condition is perma-
52. "Some argue that social Darwinism and the eugenics movement are
becoming as influential in American thinking currently as when they flourished
early in this century. When a culture values human life conditionally, suicide
intervention becomes selective." Carol J. Gill, Suicide Intervention for People with
Disabilities: A Lesson in Inequality, 8 ISSUES IN. L. & MED. 37, 37 (1992). See also
Paul K. Longmore, Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide and Social Prejudice, 3 ISSUES
IN L. & MED. 141 (1987).
53. 225 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
54. Id. at 305.
55. Another example of a court characterizing a decision to withdraw
treatment as brave while regarding ambivalence or hesitancy as somehow signs
of depression can be found in Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220,
223 (Ct. App. 1984). The patient's statements and acts which indicated that his
decision to die might not be strong or firm were dismissed by the court with the
statement that it was not relevant "that Mr. Bartling periodically wavered from
this posture because of severe depression or for any other reason." Id. at 223.
Remarkably, the court did not consider the possibility that the desire to die
itself, rather than the desire to continue to live, might have been the real
consequence of depression. The court went beyond merely deferring to the
decision of the patient to die to the point of endorsing it as correct.
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nent but not terminal? Obviously, some degree of social choice
is at work; autonomy is not unbounded.
The opinion of the Michigan Circuit Court in People v. Kevor-
kian56 makes this even more clear. Judge Kauftnan, tracing the
history of arguments approving suicide back to Greek philoso-
phy, concludes that the state's interest is limited to preventing
"irrational" suicide; conversely, a constitutional right exists to
commit "rational suicide." 7 The overall tone of the opinion is
libertarian, yet by limiting the right to "rational" suicide, Judge
Kaufman would allow an enormous amount of social choice.
Specifically, to claim the right, a person must have "an objective
medical condition" which "significantly impair[s]" the quality of
life, the decision to commit suicide must be "without undue
influence," and the decision must be "a reasonable response
under the circumstances."" By retaining the power to declare
some choices for suicide unreasonable, by speaking of "rational"
and "irrational" suicide, the court, straining to preserve the lan-
guage and tone of libertarianism, essentially declares a right to
end one's life to exist if a court declares that life to be of little
value.
If the community may act sometimes to prevent suicide,
then the definition of when that is not the case must look to
something other than merely the language of libertarianism. To
maintain a consistent libertarian commitment, one must essen-
tially follow the lead of the Bouvia court's nonjudgmental
approach. But are we ready to accept suicide as "an absolute
right" at least where a competent adult is involved, regardless of
how strongly it appears that the decision is a consequence of
depression, fear, a sense of rejection by others or society as much
as it is a consequence of intractable physical pain?
In summary, then, the strong libertarian position greatly
exaggerates the actual independence and autonomy of the indi-
vidual. It readily accepts statements of preference at face value,
rather than exploring whether the statements are the product of
fully informed reflection, or whether they might be expressions
of desire for something other than what they initially appear to
be. Libertarians do not see that a request for death might pri-
marily be a cry to be relieved of pain, to be provided with care
and reassurance, or to have someone respond to loneliness and
56. No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1993),aff'd in
part and revd in part, Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591,
99674, 99752, 99758, 99759, 1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994).
57. Id. at *9-11, 16, 18.
58. Id. at *15.
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depression. 9 This is particularly true in cases such as Bouvia,
where the individual is not suffering from a terminal illness.6 °
But strong libertarian approaches, by enshrining expressions of
autonomous preference, provide little if any reason to draw the
line of non-intervention at the point of terminal illness.
Once one accepts, as much libertarian thought does, that
unassisted suicide is a right,61 the arguments against assisted sui-
cide do largely become untenable. They primarily are reduced
to permitting some minimal state supervision to assure that the
request is voluntary, defined as the absence of obvious coer-
cion.62 As a number of courts and commentators have pointed
out, however, the fact that states have decriminalized suicide
does not necessarily mean that they have recognized the act as a
right.63 Instead it may, and should, be seen as recognition of the
59. Robert Twycross criticizes the movement toward voluntary
euthanasia, contending that "much of the supporting 'evidence' derives from
instances in which pain or other symptoms have been inadequately controlled
and from the use of inappropriate treatments." Robert G. Twycross, Voluntary
Euthanasia, in SUICIDE EUTHANSiA 88, 97 (Samuel E. Wallace & Albin Eser eds.,
1981).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 39-54.
61. See, e.g., Joseph Fletcher, In Defense of Suicide, in SUICIDE EUTHANASIA,
supra note 59, at 38-50. See Chief Justice Lamer's dissenting opinion in
Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107 D.L.R. 4th 342, 349-86 (1993) (Can.), which
turns on the fact that the practical effect of criminalizing assisted suicide is to
prevent only the disabled from suicide, an option open to those who can
accomplish the act without assistance.
62. Clearly involuntary euthanasia is opposed even by most advocates of
voluntary euthanasia. See HUMPHRY, supra note 29. But, of course, coercion may
be much more subtle. See the discussion of "acquiescent suicide" in Nancy J.
Osgood & Susan A. Eisenhandler, Gender and Assisted and Acquiescent Suicide: A
Suicidologist's Perspective, 9 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 361 (1994).
63. See Rodriguez, 107 D.L.R. 4th at 398. The Canadian court stated:
Unlike the situation with the partial decriminalization of abortion, the
decriminalization of attempted suicide -cannot be said to represent a
consensus by Parliament or by Canadians in general that the
autonomy interest of those wishing to kill themselves is paramount to
the state interest in protecting the life of its citizens. Rather, the
matter of suicide was seen to have its roots and its solutions in sciences
outside the law, and for that reason not to mandate a legal remedy.
Id. See also Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1464 n.9
(W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd, No. 94-35534, 1995 WL 94679 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1995).
In that case, the court maintained the following:
Notably, the statute at issue does not bar suicide, nor does any
other Washington statute.... Needless to say, this change in the law
did not suggest approval of the act of suicide, but rather a determina-
tion that the person compelled to attempt it should not be punished if
the attempt proved unsuccessful.
1995]
380 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9
fundamental irrationality of responding to an individual's self-
destructive act with criminal sanctions.
If an act of suicide is neither a crime nor a courageous
expression of autonomy, it most likely is, on some level, a cry for
help. Perhaps the most disturbing thing about the libertarian
approach to the "right to die" is its tendency to absolve us, as
individuals or as a society, from a sense of responsibility to
others. Do we provide enough support for the handicapped?
Does medicine devote enough attention to the relief of pain?"4
Does the absence of universal health care insurance make people
choose an earlier death in order not to financially burden their
relatives? Do social attitudes emphasizing the importance of
physical perfection send disturbing messages about what type of
life is not worth living? If suicide is merely an act of autonomy,
we need not address these questions.
Of course, on some level we must (and do) address these
questions. As I have argued elsewhere," even in the context of
carrying out advance directives for the withdrawal of treatment, a
step now generally sanctioned by law, what is presented as mere
deference to individual autonomy contains a large element of
social choice about the nature and value of life. Similarly, the
use of an agent to assist in a decision to terminate life involves
some degree of social choice. Almost all would agree that under
some circumstances, assisted suicide should be forbidden. But
except for cases involving minors and the incompetent, liberta-
rian theory provides us with little guidance in setting limits.
Should we condone assistance in the suicide of a physically
healthy twenty-five year old in the aftermath of a failed love
affair, or a career setback? If not, then we must accept that soci-
ety has a role to play in these decisions. The mere assertion of
autonomy does not end the matter. And if that is so for the phys-
ically healthy twenty-five year old, it must also be the case for the
permanently disabled person, even the terminally ill patient.
This does not mean that our conclusion must or should be the
same in each case, but it does mean that society must be involved
in the decision of where to draw the line.
This seems to be apparent even to several courts which gen-
erally use libertarian language. The circuit court in Kevorkian
affirms a right to "rational suicide;"66 but, of course, society will
decide the boundaries of the rational. The Bergstedt court would
support a right to suicide in response to physical, but not emo-
64. See Twycross, supra note 59.
65. See Beschle, supra note 33.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
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tional, suffering." Again, social choice is at work. Quite prop-
erly, most of us refuse to follow the assertion that a competent
adult has absolute power over his or her body to its logical con-
clusion. Libertarian thought, which unrealistically minimizes
interdependence, cannot lead us to acceptable answers here.
II. THE MAJORITARIAN APPROACH
The most obvious alternative to libertarian constitutional
analysis is majoritarianism. While even the most deferential
majoritarianism will concede that in some cases the Constitution
requires invalidation of legislative choices,68 the scope of such
cases can be minimized. Where the asserted individual right is
novel, where there is a long history of legislative involvement,
and where strong ethical and policy arguments can be framed on
both sides of an issue, the case for deference may well be the
strongest. And in the view of some, this is precisely the case with
the "right to die." Thus, in his separate opinion in Cruzan, Jus-
tice Scalia states his preference "that we announce, clearly and
promptly, that the federal courts have no business in this field" 69
that the Justices are in no better position than "nine people
picked at random from the Kansas City telephone directory"7" to
resolve these issues; and that legislative decisions, even those
which would prohibit voluntary passive euthanasia, should be
upheld.71
On its surface, deference to majorities is the antithesis of the
libertarian approach. Certainly the two approaches envision very
different roles for courts. But the two approaches have one sig-
nificant thing in common. Neither places much of a burden on
the individual tojustify his or her choices. To the libertarian, the
rights-bearing individual acting within a sphere of autonomy may
act not only in ways which harm the community, but in ways
which seem to others to be foolish or even irrational with respect
67. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49.
68. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1971):
[O]ne essential premise of the Madisonian model is majoritarianism.
The model also has a counter-majoritarian premise, however, for it
assumes that there are some areas of life a majority should not control.
There are some things a majority should not do .. .no matter how
democratically it decides to do them.
Id.
69. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 293, 300.
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to the individual's own welfare.72 To a majoritarian, the individ-
ual likewise has no obligation to justify his or her vote as wise,
ethically sound, or even rational, although the individual must
obey the laws adopted by the majority. Debate and rational argu-
ment might be wise tactics for gaining the votes of others, but
they are not required for the system to function and to be legiti-
mate. Thus, Justice Scalia maintains that "[t] his Court need not
and has no authority to, inject itself into every field of human
activity where irrationality and oppression may theoretically,
occur."73 Neither libertarianism nor majoritarianism, then, insist
on rational dialogue. Each ultimately is grounded in unfettered
individual choice. The only difference being that one defers to
each individual, while the other defers to the aggregate of unfet-
tered individual choices.
Even if Scalia is correct in his conclusion that a state's deci-
sion to ban all forms of euthanasia violates no constitutional
command, can he possibly be right that the Court has no role to
police "irrationality and oppression" outside of those areas which
the constitutional text marks off as specially protected? Much
scholarship suggests that the framers did consider legislatures to
be acting legitimately only when they were acting in pursuance of
the common good."4 While this leaves much room for action,
since the common good may be defined in so many ways, it does
call for the legislature to make at least some effort to justify its
choices.75 Thus, the core requirement of "substantive due pro-
cess" has always been that the legislature act with at least minimal
rationality. Even Holmes and the other dissenters in Lochner v.
New York would impose such a requirement.
76
72. Thus, libertarian thought would criticize arguments against the
legalization of drugs based upon harm to the user as "paternalism." See, e.g.,
DOUGLAS N. HusAK, DRUGS AND RIGHT 130-47 (1992). In the same vein, the
tobacco industry has argued that "the efforts to deny the right to pursue the
satisfactions of smoking add up to nothing less than tyranny." RONALD J.
TROYER & GERALD E. MARKLE, CIGARETrEs: THE BATTLE OVER SMOKING 104
(1983) (quoting Tobacco Institute statement).
73. 497 U.S. at 300-01 (Scalia, J., concurring).
74. See, e.g., Symposium on Classical Philosophy and the American Constitutional
Order, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3 (1990) (essays on the framers' attitudes toward
"civic republican" theories).
75. Cass Sunstein contends: "Above all, the American Constitution was
designed to create a deliberative democracy .... The minimal condition of
deliberative democracy is a requirement of reasons for government action."
CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 20 (1993).
76. Thus, Holmes would have upheld the statute in Lochner because "[a]
reasonable man might think it a proper measure on the score of health."
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justices
Harlan, White and Day would have upheld the statute since it was not
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And if courts must guard against at least blatant irrationality,
does this not also apply to cases of "oppression"? Surely govern-
ment has a wide range of authority to curtail individual liberty in
pursuance of the general welfare. However, there must be some
limits. Thus, imposing the death penalty upon a random
number of those who file fraudulent tax returns might be mini-
mally rational in that a legislature could sincerely believe that it
reduces the level of tax fraud. Yet is there any doubt that even
justices who do not feel that the death penalty is per se unconsti-
tutional would find the disproportion between the burden this
places on a few individuals and the benefit to the community
unconstitutional "oppression"?77
Neither strong libertarianism nor complete deference to leg-
islative majorities presents a satisfactory framework for analysis of
constitutional rights claims. Each oversimplifies complex reali-
ties, and neither calls on people, either as rights-bearers or vot-
ers, to engage in reflection and dialogue concerning their
preferences. And yet, these seem to be the most commonly
adopted approaches in "right to die" cases.
Several courts have rejected the libertarian position on the
"right to die," most often by denying that the Constitution has
anything to say on the subject. Courts taking this position need
not address the ultimate issues of ethics or policy involved; they
need only declare that the forum in which they must be
addressed is legislative rather than judicial. As already noted,
this position is most clearly set forth by Justice Scalia in his
Cruzan concurrence. 78 Thus, even in the context of a refusal of
treatment, and certainly in the context of an assisted suicide, "it
is up to the citizens of [the state] to decide, through their elected
representatives, whether that wish will be honored."79 In light of
a history of government disapproval, if not criminalization, of sui-
cide and assisted suicide plus the absence of a specific textual
reference to the claimed right, Scalia finds no basis for regarding
.unreasonable" or "arbitrary." Id. at 66-74 (Harlan, White and Day, JJ.,
dissenting). The dissenters, of course, were far more deferential to the
legislature in their assessment of what actions are rational than the majority, but
all agreed that some minimum requirement of legitimate ends and rational
means to those ends exists.
77. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (death penalty
unconstitutionally disproportionate to guilt of felony murder participant who
neither kills nor intends that a killing take place); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977) (mandatory death penalty for rape unconstitutional).
78. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292-301 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 293.
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this as an area for the assertion of fundamental rights.8 0 He
maintains that in practice, it is the equal protection clause which
will set "reasonable and humane limits" here; when people
impose the same limits on themselves as on others, dispropor-
tionate individual burdens are unlikely to arise.81
. Other courts have been constrained by the majority position
in Cruzan or by state authority to acknowledge a right to refuse
treatment, but have drawn the line at assisted suicide. Thus, the
Court of Appeals of Michigan, while affirming on other grounds
Judge Kaufman's decision in People v. Kevorkian,8" rejected the
notion that there was a constitutional right to commit suicide or
to secure assistance in doing so.8" The court stated that no bal-
ancing was required since "[t] he scope of rights encompassed by
the concept of ordered liberty does not include the right to com-
mit suicide, much less the right to assisted suicide."84 The court
noted Cruzan, but limited the right recognized there to the right
"to refuse unwanted medical treatment and passively die a natu-
ral death, not to actively intervene so as to hasten one's death."85
Similarly, in Donaldson v. Van de Kamp,"6 the California
appellate court noted the right to refuse treatment recognized in
such cases as Bouvia, but denied the right to have assistance in
hastening one's death, and expressed skepticism over the right of
suicide without assistance.8 7 Factually, the case is unique. Don-
aldson, suffering from a malignant brain tumor, wished to be
"cryogenically suspended." That is, while still alive, he would be
frozen to the point where circulatory, respiratory and brain func-
tions would cease, and he would be clinically dead. The purpose,
however, was to "later reanimate[ ] [him] when curative treat-
ment exists for his brain cancer." 8 Ironically, to pursue what
most would see as a futile desire for something resembling
immortality, Donaldson had to seek to hasten his death.
80. Id. at 293-95, 300.
81. Id. at 300.
82. Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. ApR1994),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591, 99674, 99752,
99758, 99759, 1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994).
83. Id. at 493. The court affirmed Judge Kaufman's decision on the
grounds that the statute violated the provision of the Michigan constitution
limiting a bill to a single subject. Id. at 489-91.
84. Id. at 492.
85. Id. at 493.
86. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Ct. App. 1992).
87. Id. at 61-64.
88. Id. at 61. At the time of the decision, the tumors had "caused ...
weakness, speech impediments and seizures." Doctors projected that
Donaldson would die in about eighteen months. Id. at 60-61.
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While stating that there was no right involved, the court
went on to discuss the weight of the state interests to be balanced
against the individual's interest in assisted suicide."9 Most see the
central state interest in prohibiting even the most sympathetic
cases of assisted suicide as some variation on the "slippery slope"
argument: a bright line is necessary to protect those for whom
suicide would not be truly voluntary."a This is surely an impor-
tant concern, but the fact that the court felt the need to bring it
up is significant. One might think that having made an initial
decision that assisted suicide implicates no constitutional rights,
a court would not need to go further. Recall Justice Scalia's
admonition that courts are not authorized to generally police the
possible irrationality and oppression of duly enacted statutes.9
But can Scalia's statement be entirely true? Even deferential
justices dating back to and including Holmes state that the due
process clause guards against arbitrary and irrational legislative
acts.9" The point of contention is always just how heavy the bur-
den of showing rationality is. Scalia's statement may be taken to
mean that the enactment of a statute is irrefutable proof of its
minimal rationality.93 Yet that is inconsistent with prior Court
decisions; although it is rare, sometimes a court will hold a stat-
ute to be irrational.94
This leads us to the question of what it means for a statute to
be rational. The classic definition of minimum rationality for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes is that a statute must have a
reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 95 The test
can be seen as entirely utilitarian. Unlike the strict scrutiny test
89. Id. at 62-65.
90. Id.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
92. See supra note 76.
93. Perhaps the most powerful recent statement of deference under the
rational basis test appears in FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct.
2096, 2101-02 (1993):
In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that
neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental
constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the classification.
The standard, said the Court, does not even require the legislature to clearly
articulate its reasons; it is sufficient that the court can find some plausible
reason.
94. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); United States Dep't of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
95. See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsrrutrloNAL LAw 581-86
(2d ed. 1988).
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used where fundamental rights are involved, there need be no
proportionality between the social good and the impact of the
statute on the individual. Under this analysis, there can be little
doubt that the prohibition on assisted suicide, if not a prohibi-
tion on suicide itself, qualifies as rational. Although some will be
harmed, some will benefit, and courts need strike no balance.
But can that really be correct? Even at the level of "low-level
scrutiny," is there no limit on, to use Scalia's word, "oppression?"
May rationality be satisfied with absolutely no regard to the
extent to which an individual is used as a means to addressing
the ends of society? Surely there is no requirement that law
never decide how to treat an individual on the basis of that deci-
sion's effect on others, but isn't there some limit on the extent to
which the individual can be treated as a means to a social end?
Take, for example, the question of punishment. From a
purely utilitarian view, is there any reason to insist upon propor-
tionality between the nature of the crime and the punishment
imposed? Yet although the death penalty is not per se unconsti-
tutional,9 6 the range of crimes for which it can be imposed is
quite narrow.9 7 The thief may not be executed merely to deter
others; there must be some consideration of the rationality of the
act as it pertains to him alone. While general utility is undoubt-
edly a large component of rationality, then, there is reason to
believe that at some point the burden on the individual may
grow to the point where the imbalance seems irrational.
As a further example, take Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc.," one of the few recent Supreme Court cases to hold a stat-
ute invalid under low-level scrutiny. A local zoning ordinance, it
was held, could not exclude group homes for the mentally
retarded from a residential district simply in pursuance of the
goal of preserving property values.99 The Court held that prop-
erty values would fall, if at all, only in response to irrational fears
of the handicapped, and thus a seemingly rational economic
concern stands unmasked as actually irrational prejudice. °0 But
doesn't this case also suggest that there is something simply
wrong ("oppressive," if you will) about achieving a social goal
with disproportionate disregard for how much of the burden is
borne by a small, identifiable group of people, who have done no
wrong?
96. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
97. See supra note 77.
98. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
99. Id. at 448.
100. Id.
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In one sense, majoritarianism accepts the same framework
for analysis as libertarianism; the initial inquiry of whether an
identifiable individual right can be isolated essentially deter-
mines the ultimate question. But doesn't the Constitution place
limits on government power that are more general, that need not
be linked to a specific list of fundamental rights? One of these is
the obligation to act with at least some degree of rationality, and
the cases involving the due process privacy right in general, 1 '
and the "right to die" in particular suggest that one component
of rationality is some degree of proportionality between individ-
ual burdens and social welfare, at least to the point where the
treatment of the individual does not show complete indifference
to the individual.
The problem with strong majoritarianism, then, is that by
setting no limits at all, it may permit instances which impose dis-
proportionate burdens on those who no longer are in a position
to share in the social benefits sought by the prohibition. Even if
it leads to social benefits to subject an individual to a lengthy
period of intense pain, it will strike many of us as simply cruel,
and the cruelty, it would seem, challenges the notion that the
decision is truly rational.
In light of the shortcomings in the libertarian approach to
"right to die" questions, one might take the majoritarian position
as the lesser of two evils. Any government response to the ques-
tion of suicide and assisted suicide, including total prohibition
would present no constitutional problem. But that choice
should not be made without a search for less troublesome
alternatives.
III. ARE DEONTOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVES APPROPRIATE?
If the fundamental flaw of both strong libertarian and strong
majoritarian approaches is their overemphasis on individual pref-
erence, the natural response would be to search for an approach
101. For example, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), which
struck down a statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried persons, the Court stated that if it were to concede that deterrence
of extramarital sex was a legitimate state interest, it still would be unreasonable
to prescribe "pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as punishment for
fornication." Id. at 448. In other words, even a legitimate social goal may not
be sought at the cost of disproportionately burdening an individual. And the
"undue burden" analysis of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992), recognizes a legitimate state interest in the protection of life
throughout the nine months of pregnancy while at the same time protecting a
core right to abortion, seems largely concerned with questions of the
proportionality of the state's response to its legitimate interest.
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grounded entirely in duty, with that duty imposed by some
source independent of the individual or some aggregate of indi-
viduals. A deontological approach, whether grounded in reli-
gious or secular concepts of duty, might well be a fruitful course
for one seeking to derive an ethical position on the question of
assisted suicide. An individual, having derived such a position,
could then argue for a right to apply it to his or her own actions,
under libertarian theory, or vote to impose it throughout the
community through majoritarian processes.
An approach based on duty could be particularly attractive
to those seeking an alternative to a libertarian approach to the
right to die, since it may result in the conclusion that govern-
ment has a positive duty, not merely an option, to prohibit sui-
cide and assisted suicide. Many will find a majoritarian choice to
permit assisted suicide ethically objectionable.
But the focus of this article is on the proper approach to be
taken by courts in the debate, and these approaches will be of
limited use in that context. Courts, of course, may not justify
their decisions on religious grounds, and even when limiting
themselves to secular philosophies, courts do not have the option
of starkly stating that their constitutional judgments are based
upon positive duties imposed upon the state. Courts consistently
view the Constitution as a limiting document making certain leg-
islative acts impermissible (marking a line between liberty and
majority rule), but not as a document mandating specific legisla-
tive acts.1"' As citizens, we use the language of duty to urge legis-
latures to adopt courses of action,1"3 but as constitutional
lawyers, we argue about the limitations on legislative actions, not
which outcomes are best.
Thus, it will not be possible to derive a position on the con-
stitutionality of prohibitions on assisted suicide entirely from
notions of positive duty, whether that is seen as a duty to preserve
life or a duty to care for others. That does not, however, mean
that notions of duty will have no place in the analysis of the
102. Thus, the Supreme Court has consistently refused to find that the
Constitution requires government to provide social services or benefits beyond
what the positive law of the state requires. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (Fourteenth Amendment is
a limitation on the state, "not ... a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety
and security"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(no fundamental right to public education); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970) (no fundamental right to welfare payments).
103. The Court has emphasized that arguments that the state should
assume a greater duty should be addressed to the legislature. See DeShaney, 489
U.S. at 201-03; San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 58-59; Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 487.
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issues. To reject strong libertarian individualism is not to say that
liberty and the individual may be ignored; to reject deontological
approaches as positing rules regardless of individual or social
choice is not to entirely reject the existence of some notion of
duty. A viable alternative must take account of each of these
considerations.
IV. THE COMMUNITARIAN ALTERNATIVE
Recently, a number of theorists from law, social science and
ethics, searching for an alternative to libertarianism which at the
same time avoids authoritarianism, have gathered under the
label of communitarianism. 1°4 The communitarian movement is
defined less by specific answers to social problems than by a com-
mitment to an analysis which insists on a balance between indi-
vidual and community, between rights and responsibilities."0 5
Communitarianism highlights, rather than masks, the connec-
tions between decisions of individuals. Since it does not accept
mere statements of preference, either by the individual or the
majority, as automatically worthy of acceptance, it insists that the
decisions be justified. Thus, the individual must, at the very least,
be aware of the consequences of his or her actions on the com-
munity, and vice versa.
The "platform" endorsed by dozens of social, legal and polit-
ical figures gathered under the communitarian banner states:
A communitarian perspective does not dictate particu-
lar policies. Rather, it mandates attention to what is often
ignored in contemporary policy debates: the social side of
human nature; the responsibilities that must be borne by
citizens, individually and collectively, in a regime of rights
... the ripple effects and long-term consequences of pres-
ent decisions....
The basic Communitarian quest for balances between
individuals and groups, rights and responsibilities, and
among the institutions of state, market, and civil society is a
constant, ongoing enterprise.10 6
104. See generally AMrrm ETzIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITr. RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE COMMU.NITARIAN APPROACH (1993).
105. See The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities,
reprinted in ETZIONI, supra note 104, at 251-67.
106. ETZIONI, supra note 104, at 254. The signers of the Platform include
such figures as Robert Bellah, Henry Cisneros, Harvey Cox, Amitai Etzioni,
William Galston, Mary Ann Glendon, Jane Mansbridge, Newton Minow,
William Ruckelshaus, Albert Shanker and Lester Thurow. See 2 THE RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY, Winter 1991-92, at 18-20.
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Like all "balancing" tests, communitarian approaches are
not as determinate as the alternatives which follow one premise
to its logical conclusion. They are recognizable not so much by
the conclusion reached as the process undertaken to reach it,
and perhaps also by those conclusions avoided, that is, those that
regard as inconsequential the welfare of either the individual or
the community. Yet by squarely facing the complex relationship
between individual and community, this approach may lead to
far better results than more determinate alternatives.
Communitarians favor the unambiguous promotion of "core
values," those which are overwhelmingly endorsed by Ameri-
cans. 10 7 Focus on the specific applications of those values which
are most sharply contested has obscured the broad range of val-
ues which are shared. As sociologist Amitai Etzioni, a leading
spokesman for communitarianism, reminds us. "Nobody consid-
ers it moral to abuse children, rape, steal (not to mention com-
mit murder), be disrespectful of others, discriminate, and so
on."'08 When issues are on the cutting edge, however, com-
munitarians reject "either-or" solutions in favor of attempts to
work toward a response which respects both individual and social
claims."° Such responses will not satisfy maximalists on either
side, but they may lead to workable consensus.
All self-described communitarians, then, cannot be expected
to agree on all issues." 0 And there is no single communitarian
position on the question of assisted suicide. 1" Communitarians
can be expected to reject either the strong libertarianism of
Bouvia or the equally simple retreat to majoritarianism endorsed
by Justice Scalia.
When a court is faced with a claim that a statute is unconsti-
tutional, it must, of course, ultimately choose one of two alterna-
tives, to agree or disagree. The way it reaches its decision, the
language it uses to express it, and the likely consequences of the
decision, though, need not adhere to only one of two polar
opposites. Two recent cases reach opposite conclusions on the
107. Id. at 89-107.
108. Id. at 99-100.
109. Id. at 14-15.
110. Some of those who have publicly endorsed the "Communitarian
Platform," for example, have done so while taking exception to particular
portion% Df the document. See 2 THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNrry, supra note 106, at
18-20.
111. Etzioni notes that while "[t] here is a broad consensus that we should
not terminate [medical treatment to] people who are conscious or able to
regain conscibusness," and "a strong and widening consensus that we should
not continue medical services to people who are brain dead," no consensus
exists on other "right to die" questions. ETZIONI, supra note 104, at 101.
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question of assisted suicide, but avoid sweeping declarations
which either absolutize or deny the existence of some autonomy
rights. The first of these comes not from the United States, but
from the Supreme Court of Canada.
Sue Rodriguez, a 42-year old resident of British Columbia,
suffered from ALS, 12 and had a life: expectancy of two to four-
teen months. The disease is incurable, and causes progressive
deterioration of motor functions, depriving its victims of the abil-
ity to speak, move, and eventually eat or breathe without artificial
assistance. It does not, however, affect mental capacity.' 13 Ms.
Rodriguez wanted medical assistance in designing a device which
she could use "at the time of her choosing" to terminate her
life.114 Section 241 (b) of the Canadian Criminal Code criminal-
izes the act of aiding and abetting suicide;"' Ms. Rodriguez
sought an order that the section was invalid as contrary to the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
A brief explanation of the role of courts in the Canadian
constitutional structure will be helpful. Prior to the 1982 adop-
tion of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as part of the Consti-
tution Act,116  Canada followed the British tradition of
parliamentary supremacy with respect to human rights ques-
tions."' And the Charter itself stakes out a middle position
between parliamentary supremacy and the strong judicial review
of the United States system. Sections two through twenty-three
of the Charter set forth individual rights, generally including
those set out in the United States Constitution: freedom of
expression and religion,"' voting rights' 19 rights to specific pro-
cedures in criminal prosecutions,1 20 equal protection, 121 and
112. Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107 D.L.R.4th 342, 349 (1993)
(Can.). ALS, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, is commonly known as Lou Gehrig's
disease.
113. Id. at 391.
114. Id. at 349.
115. R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 241(b) (1985) (Can.) ("Every one who.., aids or
abets a person to commit suicide, whether suicide ensues or not, is guilty of an
indictable offense and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
fourteen years.").
116. Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C. app. II no. 44, pt. I (1985) (Can.).
117. See PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF .CANADA 197-203 (1985);
Roderick A. Macdonald, Procedural Due Process in Canadian Constitutional Law:
Natural Justice and Fundamental Justice, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 217, 220-30 (1987).
118. Constitution Act § 2.
119. Id. §§ 3-5.
120. Id. §§ 8-14.
121. Specifically forbidden grounds of discrimination are "race, national
or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability." Id.
§ 15.
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"the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the princi-
ples of fundamental justice."1 22
But unlike the rights provisions of the United States Consti-
tution, the Charter explicitly warns that rights are not absolutes,
but are subject to balancing. As noted above, the right to liberty
and security of the person is only violated by deprivations which
do not accord with "fundamental justice." In addition, section
one of the Charter states that all Charter rights are "subject only
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstra-
tively justified in a free and democratic society." 123 Finally, and
most inconsistent with the United States model, section thirty-
three provides that except in cases involving voting rights, lan-
guage rights and mobility rights, 24 Parliament or a provincial
legislature may expressly declare in a piece of legislation that it
will be effective "notwithstanding a provision [of the Char-
ter]."125 Such a declaration will expire in five years, unless reen-
acted.126 Thus, although Canadian courts now are empowered
to exercise judicial review to invalidate statutes as inconsistent
with constitutional guarantees of individual rights, judicial deci-
sions are not necessarily the last word on the subject. 127 Both the
express language of the Charter and Anglo-Canadian traditions
of parliamentary supremacy call for courts to adjudicate individ-
ual rights claims with considerable deference to concerns for the
general welfare.' 28
122. Id. § 7.
123. Id. § 1. This "makes clear that [charter rights] are not absolutes,"
but still places a burden on government "to establish that the ostensible breach
is a 'reasonable limit'...." Peter W. Hogg, Canada's New Charter of Rights, 32 Am.
J. CoMp. L. 283, 295 (1984).
124. Language rights are dealt with extensively by Constitution Act §§ 16-
23. See Joseph E. Magnet, The Charter's Official Languages Provisions: The
Implications of Entrenched Bilingualism, 4 Sup. CT. L. REv. 163 (1982). "Mobility
rights" include the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada and the "right to
move to and take up residence in any province." Constitution Act, 1982 § 6.
125. Constitution Act § 33.
126. Id. § 33(3)-(4).
127. Professor Hogg states that inclusion of § 33 "was a crucial element"
in securing endorsement of the new constitution by the provinces. Hogg, supra
note 117, at 298.
128. Prior to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Canadian Bill of
Rights codified many of the Charter freedoms, but the Bill had the legal status
only of an ordinary Act of Parliament. An Act for the Recognition and
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1960, 8-9 Eliz. II, ch.
44, § 1 (c)-(f) (Can.). For the most part, Canadian courts continued to defer to
parliamentary enactments despite any alleged conflict with the Bill of Rights.
See Douglas A. Schmeiser, The Role of the Court in Shaping the Relationship of the
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A five-justice majority of the Court rejected Ms. Rodriguez's
claim. Although conceding that the Charter right to liberty and
security of the person was impinged, the court held that the
restriction was "in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice."129 The government's objectives in barring assisted sui-
cide were "preserving life and protecting the vulnerable.""' ° The
issue, then, was whether the balance between the individual's
right and the state's interest was appropriate, or more specifi-
cally, "whether the blanket prohibition on assisted suicide is arbi-
trary or unfair in that it is unrelated to the states interest in
protecting the vulnerable." 1 ' While Canada has recognized a
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment,"'2 the court held
that this does not make the blanket prohibition of active eutha-
nasia unreasonable. Alluding to the "slippery slope" argument,
the court found that Parliament could rationally find that per-
mitting any exceptions would lead to abuses and "undermine the
protection of life.""33 Similar reasoning led the court to reject
Ms. Rodriguez's argument that the prohibition violated her right
to equal protection of the law, in that the decriminalization of
suicide itself meant that only the incapacitated were unable to
hasten their death from a terminal illness." 4
While the court upheld the prohibition, it did not do so by
merely denying that an individual right is involved. Instead, it
employed an explicit balancing test to weigh the rationality of
the statute and the degree of oppression involved.
Similarly, the four dissenting justices, while reaching the
opposite conclusion, did not ignore the legitimate social interests
involved. One dissenting justice saw the case as presenting a
problem of unequal protection of the laws,' 3 - two as violating the
right to liberty and security of the person,1 3 6 and one as violating
Individual to the State: The Canadian Supreme Court, 3 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 67, 71-75
(1980).
129. Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107 D.L.R. 4th 342, 387 (1993)
(Can.).
130. Id. at 404.
131. Id. at 396.
132. "Canadian courts have recognized a common law right of patients to
refuse consent to medical treatment, or to demand that treatment, once
commenced, be withdrawn or discontinued." Id. at 398 (citations omitted).
133. Id. at 410. Parliament would be justified in enacting an absolute
prohibition because "there is no certainty that abuses can be prevented by
anything less...." Id. at 401.
134. Id. at 409-10.
135. Id. at 384 (Lamer, CJ.C., dissenting).
136. Id. at 414-16 (McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dube, JJ., dissenting).
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both provisions."3 7 But in the analysis of each theory, the dissent-
ers followed essentially the same route. Each opinion began with
the premise that there is a right of self-determination which gives
some autonomy with respect to medical care at the end of one's
life.1 8 Section 241(b), then, must be justified as sufficiently
related to state interests. The state surely has an interest in pro-
tecting "vulnerable people,"3 9 but the dissenters found the total
prohibition disproportionate to the point of failing the test of
sufficient rationality. The total prohibition was overbroad in that
it "protects" some who are not vulnerable, 40 and at the same'
time, does not protect those able to terminate their lives without
assistance. Justice McLachlin found it objectionable that the
"slippery slope" argument asks one person "to bear the burden of
the chance that other people in other situations may act crimi-
nally to kill others or improperly sway them to suicide."' 41 One
who establishes true consent should not be held hostage to the
interests of those who may not, in the future, consent.
Chief Justice Lamer, who also dissented, stated that even
though he would declare section 241 (b) to be invalid, he would
also suspend the declaration of invalidity for twelve months to
permit Parliament to reconsider the issue and produce a provi-
sion more carefully tailored to the state's interest. He would
allow individuals in Ms. Rodriguez's position to apply for exemp-
tions during this period.'42 Thus, even in urging the invalidity of
the statute, the Chief Justice affirmed the limitation of the indi-
vidual right, and the legitimate role of the legislature.
The communitarian aspect of Rodriguez is not its outcome,
but rather its approach; both majority and dissenting justices
take seriously both the duty of the legislature to justify serious
limits on individual liberty and the fact that liberty is subject to
justifiable limits. As noted, the Canadian Constitution explicitly
calls for such balancing, but the same approach can be found in
United States cases as well. A recent example directly addresses
the question of assisted suicide.
In Compassion in Dying v. Washington,14 the United States
District Court held that Washington's complete prohibition on
137. Id. at 412 (Cory, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 363 (Lamer, C.J.C., dissenting); id. at 415-16 (McLachlin and
L'Heureux-Dube, JJ., dissenting); id. at 413 (Cory, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 372 (Lamer, C.J.C., dissenting).
140. Id. at 373.
141. Id. at 417-18 (McLachlinJ., dissenting).
142. Id. at 379-85 (Lamer, C.J.C., dissenting).
143. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd, No. 94-35534, 1995 WL
94679 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1995).
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assisted suicide was unconstitutional. Press accounts generally
reported this as an unambiguous victory for "right to die" advo-
cates."' Surely it furthers the "right to die" cause more than a
contrary decision would have, but the decision is much more
cautious than it might have been. While invalidating a complete
prohibition, the decision leaves substantial room for regulation.
The patient plaintiffs were mentally competent patients suf-
fering from incurable illnesses and were all, significantly, in the
terminal phases of their disease. 145 Compassion in Dying, "an
organization which provides support, counseling and assistance
to mentally competent, terminally ill adult patients considering
suicide," was an additional plaintiff.'46 Compassion in Dying
operates under written protocols considerably more extensive
than those used elsewhere147 to guard against abuse:
Eligible patients must be considered terminally ill in
the judgment of the primary care physician and must be
capable of understanding their own decisions. Evaluation
by a mental health professional may be obtained to insure
that the patient's request is not motivated by depression,
emotional distress or mental illness. A request for assisted
suicide must not be the result of inadequate comfort care,
nor can it be motivated by a lack of adequate health insur-
ance or other economic concerns. The request must come
from the patient personally, in writing or on videotape,
and must be repeated three times, with an interval of at
least 48 hours between the second and third requests.
Requests may not be made through advance directives or
144. See, e.g., Don Colburn & Joan Biskupic, U.S. Ruling on Washington
Law Fuels Legal Battle Over Suicide, WASH. POST, May 6, 1994, at A2; Timothy
Egan, Federal Judge Says Ban on Suicide Aid Is Unconstitutiona N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
1994, at Al; Cynthia Hubert, Helping Patients Die: Court Cases Fuel Fierce Moral
Debate, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 15, 1994, at Al.
145. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1456-57.
146. Id. at 1458.
147. The Netherlands has taken the position that while euthanasia
remains formally a crime, it will not be prosecuted under certain circumstances.
Just what those circumstances are has evolved through court decisions. See
CARLos F. GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH 19-56 (1991). Some of the suggested
citeria are more permissive than others, and Gomez finds that physicians
operate in ways that go beyond even the most permissive formally stated
criteria. Id. at 95-125. In the United States, Dr. Jack Kevorkian provides
assistance to people who he has known for only a few days, apparently after
determining only that, to his satisfaction, they are irreversibly ill and actually
wish to die, whether or not they are terminally ill. Paul S. Miller, The Impact of
Assisted Suicide on Persons With Disabilities - Is It a Right Without Freedom ? 9 ISSUES
IN L. & MED. 47 (1993).
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by a health-care surrogate, attorney-in-fact or any other
person.
According to its guidelines, Compassion in Dying will
not assist anyone to commit suicide who expresses any
ambivalence or uncertainty. If the patient has immediate
family members or other close personal friends, their
approval must be obtained. If any members of the imme-
diate family express disapproval, Compassion in Dying will
not provide assistance with suicide. As an additional safe-
guard, Compassion in Dying requires the patient to pro-
vide medical records. A consulting physician must review
them to verify the patient's terminal prognosis and deci-
sion-making capability as well as to rule out inadequate
pain management as the reason for requesting assisted
suicide.14
s
The court, then, had before it, not only a sympathetic
patient plaintiff, but a patient assistance group which had set
forth an extensive set of procedures designed to address nearly
all of the concerns raised by those with reservations about
assisted suicide. Drawing on Cruzan and the Supreme Court's
recent abortion decision, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,149 the court
found that the autonomy principles of these cases led to the con-
clusion "that a competent, terminally ill adult has a constitution-
ally guaranteed right under the Fourteenth Amendment to
commit physician-assisted suicide." 5 ' As with Casey, however,
this privacy right does not protect against all impediments, but
only against "undue burdens. " '-"
In the context of abortion, an undue burden is one which
would "operate as a substantial obstacle" to an informed, deliber-
ate decision to obtain an abortion. It does not include burdens
which merely regulate in pursuance of assuring that the decision
is informed and deliberate, or in pursuance of some other strong
government interest.1 52 Here, Judge Rothstein recognized two
powerful state interests. She recognized a general state interest
in the prevention of suicide by those "with a significant natural
life span ahead of them."' She maintained, however, as to
"people suffering through the final stage of life with no hope of
recovery... preventing suicide simply means prolonging a dying
148. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1458.
149. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
150. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1462.
151. Id. at 1462-63.
152. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819-21.
153. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1464.
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person's suffering, an aim in which the State can have nointerest." "5
The court recognized the state's authority to "define the
appropriate boundaries of physician-assisted suicide for termi-
nally ill individuals"155 and "to enact regulations and restrictions
which will ensure that undue influence from third parties plays
no part"156 in the decision. For instance, the state has a clear
interest in "protecting people from committing suicide due to
undue influence or duress. . . "57 The suggestion seems clear
that if the state were to enact something resembling the Compas-
sion in Dying protocol as limiting the permissible boundaries of
assisted suicide, that such a decision would be constitutional.
Thus, while the court recognized a right, it also was willing to
respect limits to that right. While the court recognized the
authority of majorities to pursue the general welfare, likewise,
that authority was not without limits.
At first glance, Rodriguez and Compassion in Dyingwould seem
to have little in common. They reach different conclusions, and
come from different constitutional systems which historically
take different positions on the relative power of legislatures and
courts to assess the constitutionality of government acts. But in
the way they approach the problem of assisted suicide, they seem
to be more similar to each other than Compassion in Dying is to
Bouvia, or Rodriguez is to Donaldson. Rather than focusing on the
existence or non-existence of a "right to die" or more specifically,
a right to commit suicide, and moving from that conclusion to an
obvious result, both Rodriguez and Compassion in Dying recognize
the existence of rights and their limits, as well as the authority of
legislative bodies to act in furtherance of social goals while at the
same time assuming the responsibility to justify their decisions
with something more than merely noting that they accurately
reflect the sum of constituent preferences. In each case, the gov-
ernment is required to put forward a serious defense of the
rationality of its statute, but in each case also, the mere invoca-
tion of autonomy will not prevail when a convincing showing of a
sufficiently rational statute is made.
V. APPLYING THE COMMUNITARIAN APPROACH
A communitarian approach would avoid the conclusion that
there are no limits on government's power to act in the area of
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1466.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1465.
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suicide and assisted suicide, but at the same time would not
begin by postulating a right to suicide, or even a "right to die" in
cases of passive euthanasia. Rather, it would acknowledge the
legitimacy, indeed the inevitability of social choice in these mat-
ters, and encourage public deliberation, primarily in the legisla-
tive arena. But courts would retain a role in the process, insisting
that legislatures justify their actions with rational argument.
Courts should hesitate before attempting to have the last word,
but not abdicate their role in the dialogue. Several principles
should guide courts in addressing those issues.
A. There Is No Fundamental "Right" to Suicide, Assisted or
Otherwise
American constitutional law has become closely associated
with the concept of defending discrete "fundamental" rights.
This has obscured, if not overwhelmed, the notion that there are
limits on government action which are more general, which need
not be traced to a short list of specified individual rights. This
may explain the persistence of libertarian thought and language
in "right to die" cases. A strong instinct that there must be some
limits on government power leads, in the absence of alternative
arguments, to the adoption of libertarian premises as its only ref-
uge. But, as discussed above, to work from the premise that sui-
cide is a fundamental right which calls for the invocation of strict
scrutiny, if not absolute protection, is to ignore a host of
problems. The model of the autonomous, rational suicide is
deeply flawed, and the community has important interests in
involving itself in the individual's decision.
States have abandoned the criminalization of suicide
itself.158 To the libertarian, this indicates a recognition of auton-
omy rights, but it seems more likely that what this really indicates
is a recognition that such statutes lack a rational basis. 59 What
sense does it make to respond with punishment to one who
inflicts or attempts to inflict the ultimate punishment upon him-
self? If this is so, then criminalization of suicide might violate
constitutional norms entirely apart from the existence of a right
to suicide. And this leads to a second principle, of equal impor-
tance with the rejection of the "fundamental right" to suicide.
158. No state currently criminalizes attempted suicide itself. Id. at 1464.
Most states, however, criminalize assistance, either by statute or through
common law principles. See HOEFLER, supra note 32, at 145.
159. See supra note 63.
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B. In Regulating Suicide, Government Must Act Rationally, and
Must Display Some Regard for the Individual Involved as
well as the Community as a Whole
Clearly, government must act rationally when it restricts lib-
erty, even in the absence of a fundamental right. This principle
applies to the regulation of suicide. The immediate and obvious
response to the contention that punishment of a suicide is irra-
tional is that it surely is related to a legitimate government end in
that it serves to deter others. This leads us to the following ques-
tion: may rationality be determined entirely by utilitarian calcu-
lations, or must there be some minimal proportionality between
the burden placed on the individual and the social good? Some
examples readily come to mind. In the area of criminal punish-
ments, although the Supreme Court consistently has held the
death penalty itself constitutional, it has also held that the crimes
for which it may be imposed are few."6 This conclusion cannot
rest upon purely utilitarian grounds; a rational legislator might
well conclude that the in terrorem effect of some executions for
burglary might benefit society. Obviously, there is some limit on
the extent to which the life of even a blameworthy individual may
be commandeered for the general welfare. Likewise, heavy and
progressive taxation is not unconstitutional, but complete confis-
cation of property of a selected individual is.16 1 There is some
limit to the extent to which the individual may be used as a
means to a greater end.
The "right to die" cases suggest the following principle. In
preventing suicide and assisted suicide, the government must
avoid cruelty. Cruelty exists in this context where the individual
160. See supra note 77.
161. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 622
(1981):
The Court has ... consistently rejected claims that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands as a barrier against taxes
that are 'unreasonable' or 'unduly burdensome.'.. . Moreover, there
is no requirement under the Due Process Clause that the amount of
general revenue taxes collected from a particular activity must be
reasonably related to the value of the services provided, to that activity.
Id. A state may not, however, tax a party who has no minimum contacts with
the taxing jurisdiction. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
The individual or entity taxed must, in some minimal way, share in the benefits
the state provides. In addition, the Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments permit government to regulate the use of property in a way that
reduces its value in order to promote the general welfare, but disallows the
completely disproportionate act of a complete taking without compensation.
See generally Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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is required to suffer serious pain under circumstances which indi-
cate clearly that the pain in no way serves to protect the individ-
ual's own interests, but serves exclusively as an object lesson to
others. This will allow a great deal of government involvement,
and also will not preclude the consideration of utilitarian con-
cerns, but will require some consideration of the individual. For
example, cases in which doubt may exist as to the voluntariness
of the patient's decision clearly are partially grounded in protec-
tion of the individual. 16
2
More significantly, it also justifies a large degree of what lib-
ertarians would regard as paternalism.' 6  Thus, the permanently
disabled but not terminally ill person may not have a right to
enlist another in the act of suicide because society genuinely sees
that such prohibitions are of benefit both to the individual
involved and to society.
At some point, however, it will become apparent that the
patient is kept alive merely to express to others the value of life.
In these cases, presumably involving terminal illness and signifi-
cant intractable pain, the patient is entirely a means and in no
way an end. Here, what we have can be described as cruelty, the
infliction of pain for an end which in no way includes the welfare
of the individual. A strong majoritarianism contains no limits on
this type of social choice. But it by no means goes beyond
accepted constitutional thought to insist both that government
justify criminal prohibitions as rational, and that rationality,
although it may be primarily grounded in community welfare,
must avoid the cruelty inherent in requiring a blameless person
to suffer greatly where that person's individual welfare is not at
all part of the justification for government's acts.
162. This would suggest that the holding in Cruzan was correct; where a
state has reasonable uncertainty concerning the patient's wishes, it is justified in
protecting the patient's life. A reasonable person could see this as furthering
the patient's welfare in addition to protecting the general interest in preserving
life.
163. To describe an act as paternalistic in modern discourse is almost
always to disparage it. Paternalism takes on a meaning of power and control.
Yet if the literal derivation of the word is considered, is "acting as a father would
act" dearly a bad thing? A good father, or a good mother, will often refuse to
defer to a son or daughter out of genuine concern for the other person, not
merely to impose his or her own values. If "paternalism" conjures up images of
power and control, might we replace it with "maternalism" to connote care and
concern? At any rate, even critics of paternalism will concede that sometimes it
is justified. See generally PATERNALISM (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983).
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C. While Courts Should Participate in the Dialogue Concerning
Assisted Suicide, Most Decisions Should be Left to
Legislatures
Recently, legal scholars have recognized that significant con-
stitutional changes have not been solely the consequence ofjudi-
cial decisions, but have occurred as a result of a dialogue
between courts and legislatures. 64 Courts have forced legisla-
tures to reconsider longstanding rules; in some cases the result
has been not merely acquiescence1 65 but expansion of a newly
recognized right."6 Legislative resistance, on the other hand,
has led to judicial reconsideration of at least the scope of the
right, if not its existence. 67 Thus, while the history of United
States constitutional theory does not explicitly provide for the
same level of shared responsibility between court and legislatures
in defining constitutional norms as does Canada, the building
blocks for a dialogic approach, as opposed to one which elevates
one or the other branch to a consistently dominant position are
available.
If it is clear that a communitarian approach to "right to die"
issues calls for courts to engage in balancing, it is less clear what
result that should lead to. After all, Rodriguez and Compassion in
Dying reach different conclusions. Compassion in Dying ultimately
reaches the better result, but care should be taken to read that
result narrowly. As elaborated above, an element of the test of
whether a legislature has acted rationally should be some mini-
mal requirement of proportionality; that is, that solutions to
social problems which impose extreme suffering on an individ-
ual, under circumstances where that individual will not share in
164. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HoLLow HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOuT SocIAL CHANGE? (1991), which discusses the relative importance of
courts and legislatures in changes in civil rights, women's rights and other areas
of the law in recent decades.
165. The refusal of Congress, in the wake of the Supreme Court's
unpopular decisions extending First Amendment protection to flag burning, to
amend the Constitution largely put an end to the political controversy. See
Charles Tiefer, The Flag-Burning Controversy of 1989-1990: Congress' Valid Role in
Constitutional Dialogue, 29 HARv. J. ON LEG. 357 (1992).
166. The most significant example is the civil rights legislation of 1964-
68, which significantly went beyond the holding of Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). See ROSENBERG, supra note 164, at 94-106.
167. Surely the persistent refusal of state legislatures to accept Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was a factor in the Court's subsequent limiting of
the abortion right in cases such as Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490 (1990). In contrast, the overwhelming acquiescence in the Court's
contraception cases has made the right of access to contraception safe from
serious reconsideration.
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the benefits gained by that suffering in any way (and of course,
where that suffering is not deserved punishment) interfere with
liberty in a way which violates due process requirements. At
some point, using another's suffering entirely as a means to ben-
efit others and not the sufferer constitutes cruelty. Properly
read, Compassion in Dying should be seen to stand for this princi-
ple. It does not support a "right" to suicide, assisted or otherwise,
but rather holds only that an absolute ban goes too far. The
decision encourages, indeed insists on, legislative consideration
of the question. The danger, of course, is that advocates and
other courts will be tempted to see this as merely a first step. If a
state enacts a response permitting assisted suicide only in a nar-
rowly defined category of cases involving terminal patients whose
pain cannot be adequately managed and who have been carefully
screened to assure that their decision is as voluntary as possi-
ble,168 courts should defer. The strength of the libertarian
strand of constitutional thought does pose the danger that the
narrow reading of Compassion in Dying will be seen as only a
beginning. But courts should refrain from requiring any more
than the avoidance of cruelty. Where a restriction plausibly pro-
tects the interests of the patient as well as society, it should be
upheld.
If states are compelled to recognize the existence of some
cases in which criminal punishment for assisted suicide would be
cruel and irrational, but at the same time reassured of the
authority to guard against expansion of that narrowly defined
category, we can expect states to take various approaches.
Indeed, this may occur eventually even in the absence of any con-
stitutionally based mandate. 69 Most people seem to agree that
assisted suicide is tolerable when it is a completely voluntary
choice by a patient suffering unbearable pain where no alterna-
tive methods of relieving the pain are present. 170 But this con-
sensus is likely to fragment on a number of key points. What is a
voluntary request? Does it include advance directives? If a
168. The defeated proposals to legalize assisted suicide in Washington
and California were criticized for their lack of safeguards, such as a "cooling
off" period between the request for death and the act, a psychological
examination, or involvement of the family. HOEFLER, supra note 32, at 146-48.
169. While almost all states have adopted some form of "living will"
statute dealing with termination of treatment, the statutes are by no means
uniform. See Lerner, supra note 13.
170. Public opinion polls show that when asked general questions
concerning the right of a patient faced with incurable disease to suicide, fairly
large majorities endorse it. HOEFLER, supra note 32, at 147-48. The majority
breaks down, however, when confronted with concrete proposals which are
seen to provide inadequate safeguards. Id.
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request strikes us as irrational, may it be labelled involuntary,
perhaps a reaction to depression or some other factor?171
Must the patient be terminal? Must the unbearable pain be
physical pain, or may it include psychological suffering? Is the
patient's subjective assessment of the degree of pain determina-
tive? These and other questions may be answered in different
ways by legislators acting in good faith to balance the legitimate
concerns present. One approach would be to broadly define the
circumstances under which physicians may euthanize, and
expect medical ethics to develop specific standards of acceptable
practice. 172 Another would be to carefully set forth in the statute
itself the procedures to be followed.1 7' The Compassion in Dying
protocols seem reasonably protective of all interests involved,
although it is troubling that there is no requirement that the
patient not only be terminal, but also be in pain which cannot be
adequately managed. 1
74
We have little or no reliable evidence of the consequences of
permitting assisted suicide. This is not because it does not occur;
most agree that it does.175 But it must exist sub rosa in light of its
illegality. If we leap from criminalization to the extreme of creat-
ing a zone of privacy around the act we may also find ourselves
with little information on which to base social policy.176 On the
other hand, as illustrated by the jury verdict in the Kevorkian
case, an absolute prohibition in practice may, ironically, give
more leeway to "suicide doctors." Juries, uncomfortable with
171. See Herr, supra note 51, at 20-27.
172. The Royal Dutch Society for the Promotion of Medicine has issued a
set of guidelines on euthanasia which, while noting that it is a "last resort," sets
forth general guidelines of voluntariness and unacceptable suffering which
"leaves a good deal open to professional judgment." GOMEZ, supra note 147, at
39-44. The American Medical Association recently rejected a proposal to
consider ethical guidelines for assisted suicide. AMA Shuns Assisted Suicide,
RocKy MT. NEWS, June 15, 1994, at A46.
173. The absence of sufficiently detailed safeguards is seen as the
principal reason for the defeat of the Washington and California ballot
initiatives. See supra text accompanying note 167.
174. The Compassion in Dying protocols, while requiring that
inadequate pain management be ruled out as the cause of the suicide request,
do not seem to explicitly require the presence of pain as a prerequisite. See
supra text accompanying note 148.
175. See HOEFLER, supra note 32, at 148-51; Lawrence K. Altman,
Physicians Broach Forbidden Subject of Euthanasia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1991, at C3.
176. Carlos Gomez is quite critical of the current practice in the
Netherlands and skeptical of any legalized euthanasia, but he concludes his
study by emphasizing the need for more research on the feasibility of
permitting euthanasia in a narrow range of cases while still preventing abuses.
GOMEZ, supra note 147, at 127-39.
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absolute prohibitions may be apt to acquit in cases in which far
less care was exerted to assure that the instance was actually one
of the extraordinary cases in which criminal sanctions were inap-
propriate, than they would if it was shown that the physician
failed to comply with standards which were strict but not absolute
prohibitions. Doctor Kevorkian's methods for example, fall well
short of the published protocols in Compassion in Dying.177
The notion of a right to suicide, like that of a "right to die,"
arises out of a valid instinct that some limitations must be placed
on government when it regulates how we deal with tragic
choices. But the traditional response to this instinct, the asser-
tion that there is a zone in which government may not act creates
enormous problems when applied to euthanasia. The decision
to die is not made outside of a social context created by others,
and the use of notions of autonomy as the foundation of the
right fails. But it is possible to avoid concepts of "right to die" or
a right to suicide and still place limits on government. Govern-
ment must act rationally and avoid cruelty. Within those parame-
ters, the Constitution gives government room to balance its
commitment to preserving life and the dignity of the individual.
CONCLUSION
In America, it has long been noted, all controversial social
issues also become legal issues; and so it is with the questions
presented by our newfound ability to tinker with the time and
manner of death. When social issues become legal issues, our
first reflex is to address them using the language of libertarian-
ism or majoritarianism. Thus we use the term "right to die," and
the choice of language limits our thinking. Either we defend the
right, in which case we tend to underestimate our interdepen-
dence, or we deny it, in which case we overlook the limits on the
degree to which an individual may be used as a means to a
socially beneficial end.
Neither option produces a satisfactory response to the ques-
tion of euthanasia. A rights-based approach permits us to close
our eyes to our responsibility to care for those in physical and
psychological pain and defer, in an uncritical way, to their
"autonomous" desires to die. A majoritarian approach, however,
permits us in genuinely tragic cases to use an individual entirely
as a means rather than an end, even to the point of cruelty. The
comforting apparent certainties of each approach should be
rejected in favor of communitarian balancing. Communitarian
177. See HOEFLER, supra note 32, at 151-59. A number of Kevorkian's
patients were not yet in the terminal stages of their disease.
COMMUNITARIANISM AND ASSISTED SUICIDE
balancing calls 'upon individuals to recognize that they are not
completely autonomous rights bearers, and that in some cases,
some degree of paternalism may genuinely be an expression of
care not only for the community, but for the individual. It calls
upon the community in turn to recognize that there must be pro-
portionality between social ends and the extent to which individ-
uals may be called upon to suffer disadvantage in pursuit of those
ends. It calls upon the legislature, as well as the community at
large, to produce social policy as a result of dialogue respecting
the legitimate concerns of conflicting interests. And it calls upon
courts to insist that such a dialogue take place, neither seizing
the role of final arbiter nor uncritically deferring to whatever
result the legislature produces.
With respect to assisted suicide, it appears that American
society has progressed toward a rough consensus which wisely
remains skeptical and extremely cautious, but at the same time is
unwilling to use the criminal sanction in cases in which that
seems pointless and cruel. The legal system has the responsibility
of transforming that instinct into public policy and to do so, a
communitarian framework is, if not essential, highly advisable.
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